COLUMN: Real Madrid – The Richest Victim in Spanish Football | OneFootball

At Real Madrid’s annual General Assembly this weekend, club president Florentino Perez delivered a speech brimming with confidence… and some contradictions. With the announcement of €1.073 billion in revenue—the highest in the club’s storied history—Perez underscored Real Madrid’s position as one of the most powerful institutions in global sports. Yet, his address quickly pivoted to portray the club as a besieged entity, under threat from forces that ranged from voting irregularities in the Ballon d’Or to the “monopolistic” control of European football by FIFA and UEFA.

In his critique of the Ballon d’Or voting process, Perez pointed to Vinicius Jr.’s perceived snub as evidence of a flawed system. He argued for more selective voting, yet stopped short of addressing why a club as influential as Real Madrid could not overcome such biases. Elsewhere, Perez’s criticisms extended to LaLiga and its president, Javier Tebas, who he accused of proposing policies that would divert revenues from clubs through his controversial CVC deal.

The assembly also celebrated Real Madrid’s ambitious renovation of the Santiago Bernabeu Stadium, a project that Perez described as transformative for the club’s future. While the new venue has already begun hosting concerts and other events, Perez acknowledged that these revenues remain modest (just 1% of the clubs total revenue). Which leads one to wonder then why the club would go through so much trouble hosting concerts in the first place, if their impact is so small.

As Perez detailed both triumphs and challenges, his speech revealed a paradox at the heart of Real Madrid’s narrative: a club at the pinnacle of success yet consistently framed as needing protection from external forces. Whether this framing reflects genuine concern or a strategic posture to persuade socios [members] remains a question for Real Madrid fans to consider.

La Liga’s Legal Battle Over the CVC Deal

La Liga has been embroiled in a legal and political battle surrounding its multi-billion euro deal with CVC Capital Partners, a private equity firm. The conflict stems from the outright refusal of major clubs – FC Barcelona, Real Madrid, and Athletic Club – to support the agreement, raising questions about its legality and feasibility. At one point, CVC reportedly considered withdrawing from the deal entirely, prompting La Liga’s president, Javier Tebas, to take decisive action.

To strengthen the legal footing of the agreement, Tebas and his team began lobbying Spain’s Higher Sports Council (CSD) and political parties to amend the country’s sporting law. These proposed changes aimed to address two key issues. El Confidencial reported that Tebas sought to secure stronger control over La Liga’s broadcasting rights. This would have allowed La Liga to push the deal through while ignoring opposition from the dissenting clubs. Second, the proposed changes included a clause that would give La Liga the authority to ban players registered in a future European Super League from also playing in the Spanish league.

Initially, it seemed that Tebas had successfully garnered support for these amendments. In 2022, members of Spain’s Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and the conservative Popular Party (PP) appeared to back the changes. However, this agreement unraveled, as both parties eventually walked back their support. Whether Perez directly influenced this shift remains unclear, but his strong opposition to the CVC deal and ongoing efforts to promote the Super League likely played a role in the political dynamics.

This controversy over La Liga’s CVC deal highlights the clash between collective decision-making and individual club autonomy. La Liga’s authority to sell broadcasting rights as a collective is supposed to benefit the league as a whole, allowing smaller clubs to share in the revenue generated by global brands like Real Madrid and Barcelona. With 38 out of 42 clubs in Spain’s top two divisions supporting the deal, it raises the question of whether the refusal of a few clubs – chiefly Real Madrid, Barcelona, and Athletic Club – should be enough to block the agreement.

However, Florentino Perez’s concerns about autonomy do have some validity. Forcing clubs to sell a share of broadcasting rights without their consent sets an arguably dangerous precedent for Spanish football. Real Madrid and similar clubs argue, as usual, that they contribute disproportionately to La Liga’s value and should have the final say over their assets.

What Exactly is a SAD and Why is Florentino Thinking About a Structure Change?

Central to Perez’s narrative in this weekend’s General Assembly is a proposal to change Real Madrid’s structure to a sociedad anonima deportiva (SAD). This change will allegedly safeguard Real Madrid’s fan ownership model. Let’s dive a bit into what this means.

The introduction of the SAD structure in Spain in 1990 was a response to the dire financial state of many professional sports clubs, particularly football teams, during the 1980s. At the time, Spanish football clubs were typically organised as member-owned entities (clubes deportivos), with no shareholders or external owners. While this model fostered a strong sense of community and fan involvement, it also left clubs vulnerable to poor financial management and unsustainable debt.

By the late 1980s, it became clear that many clubs were struggling to balance their books. The popularity and commercialization of football had grown significantly, and clubs were under increasing pressure to compete on the European stage. This led to reckless spending on player salaries and transfer fees, often without the necessary financial planning. As clubs amassed large debts, some faced the risk of bankruptcy. Additionally, the lack of standardised financial controls made it difficult to regulate the sport or hold club administrators accountable for mismanagement.

In response to this growing crisis, the Spanish government, led by the Ministry of Education and Culture (responsible for sports at the time), decided to intervene. The solution was to implement the SAD structure through the Ley del Deporte (Sports Law) of 1990. The law aimed to professionalise the management of sports organisations by transforming clubs into joint-stock companies. This would ensure greater transparency, introduce corporate governance, and establish financial accountability mechanisms.

Under the new system, clubs in the top two tiers of Spanish football (La Liga and Segunda Division) were required to become SADs unless they could prove they were financially solvent and well-managed. A handful of clubs, including Real Madrid, FC Barcelona, Athletic Bilbao, and Osasuna, met these criteria and were allowed to retain their traditional structures. Most other clubs, however, transitioned into SADs, with ownership shifting from fans to shareholders.

This was a turning point in Spanish football. On the one hand, it imposed financial discipline on clubs, helping to prevent insolvency and encouraging better management practices. On the other hand, it also marked a shift toward the commercialization of sports, with clubs increasingly seen as businesses rather than community-owned organizations.

Perez has framed recent debates over changes to the club’s structure as a necessary defence against ‘external threats’ like the controversial La Liga-CVC deal. According to Perez, these changes would prevent La Liga president Javier Tebas from selling Real Madrid’s share of the league’s broadcasting rights to CVC without the club’s consent.

Currently, Real Madrid is a socio-owned club, meaning it is entirely owned by its members. Perez’s proposal is framed as a protective measure, yet it’s still unclear how exactly it would safeguard the club’s broadcasting rights more effectively than the existing model. In fact, Real Madrid’s member-owned structure has arguably been a bulwark against external pressures, including the CVC deal.

Perez promises that the new SAD structure would still be 100% socio-owned, with shares tied exclusively to current members, but the lack of specifics on this plan leaves room for doubt. Even if his promises hold, the transition to a SAD could open the door for third-party investment in the future, especially during times of financial instability—a risk Perez has not fully addressed.

A Flimsy Excuse for a Complex Shift?

The prospect of shifting to a SAD is not inherently bad. Clubs like Bayern Munich and Benfica have successfully implemented hybrid models where fans maintain majority ownership while allowing private investment. Such a system could help Real Madrid raise capital and stay financially competitive without sacrificing its identity. However, Perez’s approach has been anything but transparent. By framing the discussion solely around the CVC deal and external threats, he avoids engaging in an honest conversation about the long-term implications of such a structural overhaul.

Real Madrid socios and fans deserve more than vague promises and a narrative crafted to win easy approval. A detailed and transparent plan detailing how the proposed SAD structure would operate, how it would protect member ownership, and even how it might evolve under future leadership is fair and necessary to make a well-informed decision. The real question, perhaps, isn’t whether Real Madrid should modernise its structure, but whether this transition is handled with the transparency and accountability that the Real Madrid community deserves.